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Abstract—In the context of wireless sensor networks, the
pairwise key distribution scheme of Chan et al. has several
advantages over other key distribution schemes including
the original scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor. However,
this offline pairwise key distribution mechanism requires
that the network size be set in advance, and involves all
sensor nodes simultaneously. Here, we address this issue
by describing an implementation of the pairwise scheme
that supports the gradual deployment of sensor nodes in
several consecutive phases. We discuss the key ring size
needed to maintain the secure connectivity throughout all
the deployment phases. In particular we show that the
number of keys at each sensor node can be taken to be
O(log n) in order to achieve secure connectivity (with high
probability).
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks, Security, Key predis-
tribution, Random key graphs, Connectivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are distributed collections
of sensors with limited capabilities for computations and wire-
less communications. Such networks will likely be deployed
in hostile environments where cryptographic protection will
be needed to enable secure communications, sensor-capture
detection, key revocation and sensor disabling. However, tra-
ditional key exchange and distribution protocols based on
trusting third parties have been found inadequate for large-
scale WSNs, e.g., see [6], [10], [12] for discussions of some
of the challenges.
Random key predistribution schemes were recently pro-
posed to address some of these challenges. The idea of ran-
domly assigning secure keys to sensor nodes prior to network
deployment was first proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [6].
The modeling and performance of the EG scheme, as we refer
to it hereafter, has been extensively investigated [1], [4], [6],
[11], [13], [14], [15], with most of the focus being on the full
visibility case where nodes are all within communication range
of each other. Under full visibility, the EG scheme induces so-
called random key graphs [13] (also known in the literature
as uniform random intersection graphs [1]). Conditions on the
graph parameters to ensure the absence of isolated nodes have
been obtained independently in [1], [13] while the papers
[1], [4], [11], [14], [15] are concerned with zero-one laws
for connectivity. Although the assumption of full visibility
does away with the wireless nature of the communication
infrastructure supporting WSNs, in return this simplification
makes it possible to focus on how randomizing the key
selections affects the establishment of a secure network; the
connectivity results for the underlying random key graph then
provide helpful (though optimistic) guidelines to dimension
the EG scheme.
The work of Eschenauer and Gligor has spurred the de-
velopment of other key distribution schemes which perform
better than the EG scheme in some aspects, e.g., [3], [5], [10],
[12]. Although these schemes somewhat improve resiliency,
they fail to provide perfect resiliency against node capture
attacks. More importantly, they do not provide a node with
the ability to authenticate the identity of the neighbors with
which it communicates. This is a major drawback in terms of
network security since node-to-node authentication may help
detect node misbehavior, and provides resistance against node
replication attacks [3].
To address this issue Chan et al. [3] have proposed the
following random pairwise key predistribution scheme: Before
deployment, each of the n sensor nodes is paired (offline) with
K distinct nodes which are randomly selected amongst all
other n − 1 nodes. For each such pairing, a unique pairwise
key is generated and stored in the memory modules of each of
the paired sensors along with the id of the other node. A secure
link can then be established between two communicating
nodes if at least one of them has been assigned to the other,
i.e., if they have at least one key in common. See Section II
for implementation details.
This scheme has the following advantages over the EG
scheme (and others): (i) Even if some nodes are captured,
the secrecy of the remaining nodes is perfectly preserved; and
(ii) Unlike earlier schemes, this scheme enables both node-
to-node authentication and quorum-based revocation without
involving a base station. Given these advantages, we found
it of interest to model the pairwise scheme of Chan et al.
and to assess its performance. In [16] we began a formal
investigation along these lines. Let H(n;K) denote the random
graph on the vertex set {1, . . . , n} where distinct nodes i and
j are adjacent if they have a pairwise key in common; as in
2earlier work on the EG scheme this corresponds to modeling
the random pairwise distribution scheme under full visibility.
In [16] we showed that the probability of H(n;K) being
connected approaches 1 (resp. 0) as n grows large if K ≥ 2
(resp. if K = 1), i.e., H(n;K) is asymptotically almost surely
(a.a.s.) connected whenever K ≥ 2.
In the present paper, we continue our study of connectivity
properties but from a different perspective: We note that in
many applications, the sensor nodes are expected to be de-
ployed gradually over time. Yet, the pairwise key distribution
is an offline pairing mechanism which simultaneously involves
all n nodes. Thus, once the network size n is set, there is no
way to add more nodes to the network and still recursively
expand the pairwise distribution scheme (as is possible for
the EG scheme). However, as explained in Section II-B, the
gradual deployment of a large number of sensor nodes is
nevertheless feasible from a practical viewpoint. In that context
we are interested in understanding how the parameter K needs
to scale with n large in order to ensure that connectivity
is maintained a.a.s. throughout gradual deployment. We also
discuss the number of keys needed in the memory module of
each sensor to achieve secure connectivity at every step of
the gradual deployment. Since sensor nodes are expected to
have very limited memory, it is crucial for a key distribution
scheme to have low memory requirements [5].
The key contributions of the paper can be stated as follows:
Let Hγ(n;K) denote the subgraph of H(n;K) restricted to
the nodes 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋. We first present scaling laws for the
absence of isolated nodes in the form of a full zero-one law,
and use these results to formulate conditions under which
Hγ(n;K) is a.a.s. not connected. Then, with 0 < γ1 < γ2 <
. . . < γℓ < 1, we give conditions on n, K and γ1 so that
Hγi(n;K) is a.a.s. connected for each i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ; this
corresponds to the case where the network is connected in
each of the ℓ phases of the gradual deployment. As with
the EG scheme, these scaling conditions can be helpful for
dimensioning the pairwise key distribution in the case of
gradual deployment. We also discuss the required number
of keys to be kept in the memory module of each sensor
to achieve secure connectivity at every step of the gradual
deployment. Since sensor nodes are expected to have very
limited memory, it is crucial for a key distribution scheme
to have low memory requirements [5]. In contrast with the
EG scheme (and its variants), the key rings produced by the
pairwise scheme of Chan et al. have variable size between
K and K + (n − 1). Still, we show that the maximum key
ring size is on the order logn with very high probability
provided K = O(log n). Combining with the connectivity
results, we conclude that the sensor network can maintain the
a.a.s. connectivity through all phases of the deployment when
the number of keys to be stored in each sensor’s memory is
O(log n); this is a key ring size comparable to that of the EG
scheme (in realistic WSN scenarios [4]).
These results show that the pairwise scheme can also be
feasible when the network is deployed gradually over time.
However, as with the results in [16], the assumption of full
visibility may yield a dimensioning of the pairwise scheme
which is too optimistic. This is due to the fact that the
unreliable nature of wireless links has not been incorporated in
the model. However the results obtained in this paper already
yield a number of interesting observations: The obtained zero-
one laws differ significantly from the corresponding results in
the single deployment case [16]. Thus, the gradual deployment
may have a significant impact on the dimensioning of the
pairwise distribution algorithm. Yet, the required number of
keys to achieve secure connectivity being O(log n), it is still
feasible to use the pairwise scheme in the case of gradual
deployment; the required key ring size in EG scheme is also
O(log n) under full-visibility [4].
II. THE MODEL
A. Implementing pairwise key distribution schemes
The random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et
al. is parametrized by two positive integers n and K such that
K < n. There are n nodes which are labelled i = 1, . . . , n.
with unique ids Id1, . . . , Idn. Write N := {1, . . . n} and set
N−i := N − {i} for each i = 1, . . . , n. With node i we
associate a subset Γn,i nodes selected at random from N−i
– We say that each of the nodes in Γn,i is paired to node i.
Thus, for any subset A ⊆ N−i, we require
P [Γn,i = A] =


(
n−1
K
)−1 if |A| = K
0 otherwise.
The selection of Γn,i is done uniformly amongst all subsets of
N−i which are of size exactly K . The rvs Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n are
assumed to be mutually independent so that
P [Γn,i = Ai, i = 1, . . . , n] =
n∏
i=1
P [Γn,i = Ai]
for arbitrary A1, . . . , An subsets of N−1, . . . ,N−n, respec-
tively.
On the basis of this offline random pairing, we now construct
the key rings Σn,1, . . . ,Σn,n, one for each node, as follows:
Assumed available is a collection of nK distinct cryptographic
keys {ωi|ℓ, i = 1, . . . , n; ℓ = 1, . . . ,K} – These keys are
drawn from a very large pool of keys; in practice the pool
size is assumed to be much larger than nK , and can be safely
taken to be infinite for the purpose of our discussion.
Now, fix i = 1, . . . , n and let ℓn,i : Γn,i → {1, . . . ,K}
denote a labeling of Γn,i. For each node j in Γn,i paired to
i, the cryptographic key ωi|ℓn,i(j) is associated with j. For
instance, if the random set Γn,i is realized as {j1, . . . , jK}
with 1 ≤ j1 < . . . < jK ≤ n, then an obvious labeling
consists in ℓn,i(jk) = k for each k = 1, . . . ,K with key ωi|k
associated with node jk. Of course other labeling are possible.
e.g., according to decreasing labels or according to a random
permutation. The pairwise key
ω⋆n,ij = [Idi|Idj |ωi|ℓn,i(j)]
is constructed and inserted in the memory modules of both
nodes i and j. Inherent to this construction is the fact that the
3key ω⋆n,ij is assigned exclusively to the pair of nodes i and j,
hence the terminology pairwise distribution scheme. The key
ring Σn,i of node i is the set
Σn,i := {ω⋆n,ij, j ∈ Γn,i} ∪ {ω⋆n,ji, i ∈ Γn,j} (1)
as we take into account the possibility that node i was paired to
some other node j. As mentioned earlier, under full visibility,
two node, say i and j, can establish a secure link if at least
one of the events i ∈ Γn,j or j ∈ Γn,j is taking place. Note
that both events can take place, in which case the memory
modules of node i and j each contain the distinct keys ω⋆n,ij
and ω⋆n,ji. It is also plain that by construction this scheme
supports node-to-node authentication.
B. Gradual deployment
Initially n node identities were generated and the key rings
Σn,1, . . . ,Σn,n were constructed as indicated above – Here n
stands for the maximum possible network size and should be
selected large enough. This key selection procedure does not
require the physical presence of the sensor entities and can
be implemented completely on the software level. We now
describe how this offline pairwise key distribution scheme can
support gradual network deployment in consecutive stages. In
the initial phase of deployment, with 0 < γ1 < 1, let ⌊γ1n⌋
sensors be produced and given the labels 1, . . . , ⌊γ1n⌋. The
key rings Σn,1, . . . ,Σn,⌊γ1n⌋ are then inserted into the memory
modules of the sensors 1, . . . , ⌊γ1n⌋, respectively. Imagine
now that more sensors are needed, say ⌊γ2n⌋−⌊γ1n⌋ sensors
with 0 < γ1 < γ2 ≤ 1. Then, ⌊γ2n⌋ − ⌊γ1n⌋ additional
sensors would be produced, this second batch of sensors
would be assigned labels ⌊γ1n⌋ + 1, . . . , ⌊γ2n⌋, and the key
rings Σn,⌊γ1n⌋+1, . . . ,Σn,⌊γ2n⌋ would be inserted into their
memory modules. Once this is done, these ⌊γ2n⌋−⌊γ1n⌋ new
sensors are added to the network (which now comprises ⌊γ2n⌋
deployed sensors). This step may be repeated a number times:
In fact, for some finite integer ℓ, consider positive scalars
0 < γ1 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1 (with γ0 = 0 by convention). We
can then deploy the sensor network in ℓ consecutive phases,
with the kth phase adding ⌊γkn⌋−⌊γk−1n⌋ new nodes to the
network for each k = 1, . . . , ℓ.
III. RELATED WORK
The pairwise distribution scheme naturally gives rise to the
following class of random graphs: With n = 2, 3, . . . and
positive integer K with K < n, the distinct nodes i and j
are said to be adjacent, written i ∼ j, if and only if they have
at least one key in common in their key rings, namely
i ∼ j iff Σn,i ∩ Σn,j 6= ∅. (2)
Let H(n;K) denote the undirected random graph on the vertex
set {1, . . . , n} induced through the adjacency notion (2). With
P (n;K) := P [H(n;K) is connected], we have shown [16]
the following zero-one law.
Theorem 3.1: With K a positive integer, it holds that
lim
n→∞
P (n;K) =
{
0 if K = 1
1 if K ≥ 2. (3)
Moreover, for any K ≥ 2, we have
P (n;K) ≥ 1− 27
2n2
(4)
for all n = 2, 3, . . . sufficiently large.
IV. THE RESULTS
We now present the main results of the paper. We start with
the results regarding the key ring sizes: Theorem 3.1 shows
that very small values of K suffice for a.a.s. connectivity
of the random graph H(n;K). The mere fact that H(n;K)
becomes connected even with very small K values does not
imply that the number of keys (i.e., the size |Σn,i|) to achieve
connectivity is necessarily small. This is because in contrast
with the EG scheme and its variants, the pairwise scheme
produces key rings of variable size between K and K+(n−1).
To explore this issue further we first obtain minimal conditions
on a scaling K : N0 → N0 which ensure that the key ring of
a node has size roughly of the order (of its mean) 2Kn when
n is large.
Lemma 4.1: For any scaling K : N0 → N0, we have
|Σn,1(Kn)|
2Kn
P→ n 1 (5)
as soon as limn→∞Kn =∞.
Thus, when n is large |Σn,1(Kn)| fluctuates from Kn to
Kn+(n−1) with a propensity to hover about 2Kn under the
conditions of Lemma 4.1. This result is sharpened with the
help of a concentration result for the maximal key ring size
under an appropriate class of scalings. We define the maximal
key ring size by
Mn :=
(
max
i=1,...,n
|Σn,i|
)
, n = 2, 3, . . .
Theorem 4.2: Consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 of the form
Kn ∼ λ log n (6)
with λ > 0. If λ > λ⋆ := (2 log 2− 1)−1 ≃ 2.6, then there
exists c(λ) in the interval (0, λ) such that
lim
n→∞
P [|Mn(Kn)− 2Kn| ≥ c logn] = 0 (7)
whenever c(λ) < c < λ.
In the course of proving Theorem 4.2 we also show that
P [|Mn(Kn)− 2Kn| ≥ c logn] ≤ 2n−h(γ;c) (8)
for all n = 1, 2, . . . whenever c(γ) < c < γ with h(γ; c) > 0
specified in [16].
With the network deployed gradually over time as described
in Section II, we are now interested in understanding how the
parameter K needs to be scaled with large n to ensure that
connectivity is maintained a.a.s. throughout gradual deploy-
ment. Consider positive integers n = 2, 3, . . . and K with
K < n. With γ in the interval (0, 1), let Hγ(n;K) denote the
subgraph of H(n;K) restricted to the nodes {1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋}.
Given scalars 0 < γ1 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1, we seek conditions
on the parameters K and n such that Hγi(n;K) is a.a.s.
connected for each i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ.
4First we write Pγ(n;K) := P [Hγ(n;K) is connected] =
P [Cn,γ(K)] with Cn,γ(K) denoting the event that Hγ(n;K)
is connected. The fact that H(n;K) is connected does not
imply that Hγ(n;K) is necessarily connected. Indeed, with
distinct nodes i, j = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋, the path that exists in
H(n;K) between these nodes (as a result of the assumed
connectivity of H(n;K)) may comprise edges that are not
in Hγ(n;K). The next result provides an analog of Theorem
3.1 in this new setting.
Theorem 4.3: With γ in the unit interval (0, 1) and c > 0,
consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 such that
Kn ∼ c logn
γ
. (9)
Then, we have limn→∞ Pγ(n;Kn) = 1 whenever c > 1.
The random graphs H(n;K) and Hγ(n;K) have very dif-
ferent neighborhood structures. Indeed, any node in H(n;K)
has degree at least K , so that no node is isolated in
H(n;K). However, there is a positive probability that iso-
lated nodes exist in Hγ(n;K). In fact, with P ⋆γ (n;Kn) :=
P [Hγ(n;K) contains no isolated nodes], we have the follow-
ing zero-one law.
Theorem 4.4: With γ in the unit interval (0, 1), consider a
scaling K : N0 → N0 such that (9) holds for some c > 0.
Then, we have
lim
n→∞
P ⋆γ (n;Kn) =
{
0 if c < r(γ)
1 if c > r(γ) (10)
where the threshold r(γ) is given by
r(γ) :=
(
1− log(1 − γ)
γ
)−1
. (11)
It is easy to check that r(γ) is decreasing on the interval
[0, 1] with limγ↓0 r(γ) = 12 and limγ↑1 r(γ) = 0. Since a
connected graph has no isolated nodes, Theorem 4.4 yields
limn→∞ P [Hγ(n;Kn) is connected] = 0 if the scaling K :
N0 → N0 satisfies (9) with c < r(γ). The following corollary
is now immediate from Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 4.5: With γ in the unit interval (0, 1), consider a
scaling K : N0 → N0 such that (9) holds for some c > 0. Then,
with r(γ) given by (11), we have
lim
n→∞
Pγ(n;Kn) =
{
0 if c < r(γ)
1 if c > 1 (12)
Corollary 4.5 does not provide a full zero-one law for the
connectivity of Hγ(n;Kn) as there is a gap between the
threshold r(γ) of the zero-law and the threshold 1 of the one-
law. Yet, the gap between the thresholds of the zero-law and
the one-law is quite small with 12 < 1 − r(γ) < 1. More
importantly, Corollary 4.5 already implies (via a monotonicity
argument) that it is necessary and sufficient to keep the
parameter Kn on the order of logn to ensure that the graph
Hγ(n;Kn) is a.a.s. connected. It is worth pointing out that
the simulation results in Section V suggest the existence of a
full zero-one law for Pγ(n;Kn) with a threshold resembling
r(γ). This would not be surprising since in many known
classes of random graphs, the absence of isolated nodes and
graph connectivity are asymptotically equivalent properties,
e.g., Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [2] and random key graphs [11],
among others.
Finally we turn to gradual network deployment as discussed
in Section II.
Theorem 4.6: With 0 < γ1 < γ2 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1, consider
a scaling K : N0 → N0 such that
Kn ∼ c logn
γ1
(13)
for some c > 1. Then we have
lim
n→∞
P [Cn,γ1(Kn) ∩ . . . ∩Cn,γℓ(Kn)] = 1. (14)
The event [Cγ1,n(Kn) ∩ . . . ∩ Cγℓ,n(Kn)] corresponds to
the network in each of its ℓ phases being connected as more
nodes get added – In other words, on that event the sensors
do form a connected network at each phase of deployment.
As a result, we infer via Theorem 4.6 that the condition (13)
(with c > 1) is enough to ensure that the network remains
a.a.s. connected as more sensors are deployed over time.
The main conclusions of the paper, obtained by combining
Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.6, can now be summarized as
follows:
Corollary 4.7: With 0 < γ1 < γ2 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1, consider
a scaling K : N0 → N0 such that Kn = O(log n) with
Kn ≥ max
{
(γ1)
−1, λ⋆
} · logn, n = 2, 3, . . .
Then, the following holds:
1) The maximum number of keys kept in the memory mod-
ule of each sensor will be a.a.s. less than 3Kn;
2) The network deployed gradually in ℓ steps (as in Section
II) will be a.a.s. connected in each of the ℓ phases of
deployment.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
We now present experimental results in support of the
theoretical findings. In each set of experiments, we fix n
and γ. Then, we generate random graphs Hγ(n;K) for each
K = 1, . . . ,Kmax where the maximal value Kmax is selected
large enough. In each case, we check whether the generated
random graph has isolated nodes and is connected. We repeat
the process 200 times for each pair of values γ and K in
order to estimate the probabilities of the events of interest.
For various values of γ, Figure 1(a) depicts the estimated
probability P ⋆γ (n;K) that Hγ(n;K) has no isolated nodes as
a function of K . Here, n is taken to be 1, 000. The plots
in Figure 1(a) clearly confirm the claims of Theorem 4.4:
In each case P ⋆γ (n;K) exhibits a threshold behavior and the
transitions from P ⋆γ (n;K) = 0 to P ⋆γ (n;K) = 1 take place
around K = r(γ) log n
γ
as dictated by Theorem 4.4; the critical
value K = r(γ) log n
γ
is shown by a vertical dashed line in each
plot.
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Fig. 1. a) Probability that Hγ(n;K) contains no isolated for n = 1000; in
each case, the empirical probability value is obtained through 200 experiments.
Vertical dashed lines stand for the critical thresholds asserted by Theorem 4.4.
It is clear that the theoretical findings are in perfect agreement with the practical
observations. b) Probability that Hγ(n;K) is connected for n = 1, 000
obtained in the same way. Clearly, the curves are almost indistinguishable from
the corresponding ones of part (a); this supports the claim that absence of
isolated nodes and connectivity are asymptotically equivalent properties.
Similarly, Figure 1(b) shows the estimated probability
Pγ(n;K) v.s. K for various values of γ with n = 1000. For
each specified γ, we see that the variation of Pγ(n;K) with K
is almost indistinguishable from that of P ⋆γ (n;K) supporting
the claim that Pγ(n;K) exhibits a full zero-one law similar
to that of Theorem 4.4 with a threshold behaving like r(γ).
We can also conclude by monotonicity that Pγ(n;K) = 1
whenever (9) holds with c > 1; this verifies Theorem 4.3.
Furthermore, it is evident from Figure 1(b) that for a given K
and n, Pγ(n;K) increases as γ increases supporting Theorem
4.6.
We also present experimental results that validate Lemma
4.1 and Theorem 4.2: For fixed values of n and K we have
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Fig. 2. a) Key ring sizes observed in 1, 000 experiments for n = 200 and
K = 4 – Only 2% of the key rings are larger than 3K and the largest key ring
has size 20. b) Key ring sizes observed in 1, 000 experiments for n = 500 and
K = 21 – Out of the 500, 000 key rings produced only 9 happened to be larger
than 3K while the largest size observed is 67.
constructed key rings according to the mechanism presented
in Section II. For each pair of parameters n and K , the ex-
periments have been repeated 1, 000 times yielding 1, 000×n
key rings for each parameter pair. The results are depicted in
Figures 1-4 which show the key ring sizes according to their
frequency of occurrence. The histograms in blue consider all
of the produced 1, 000× n key rings, while the histograms in
white consider only the 1, 000 maximal key ring sizes, i.e.,
only the largest key ring among n nodes in an experiment.
It is immediate from Figures 2(a)-3(b) that the key ring sizes
tend to concentrate around 2K , validating the claim of Lemma
4.1. As would be expected, this concentration becomes more
evident as n gets large. It is also clear that, in almost all cases
the maximum size of a key ring (out of n nodes) is less than
3K validating the claim of Theorem 4.2.
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Fig. 3. a) Key ring sizes observed in 1, 000 experiments for n = 1, 000
and K = 24 – 1, 000, 000 key rings are produced. Only 5 of them happened
to be larger than 3K and the largest observed key ring size is 75. b) Key ring
sizes observed in 1, 000 experiments for n = 2, 000 and K = 26 – Out of the
2000000 key rings produced only 2 happened to be larger than 3K the largest
of them having 80 keys.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the pairwise key distribution
scheme of Chan et al. which was proposed to establish security
in wireless sensor networks. This pairwise scheme has many
advantages over other key distribution schemes but deemed not
scalable due to i) large number of keys required to establish se-
cure connectivity and ii) the difficulties in the implementation
when sensors are required to be deployed in multiple stages.
Here, we address this issue and propose an implementation
of the pairwise scheme that supports the gradual deployment
of sensor nodes in several consecutive phases. We show how
should the scheme parameter be adjusted with the number n
of sensors so that the secure connectivity can be maintained
in the network throughout all stages of the deployment. We
also explore the relation between the scheme parameter and
the amount of memory that each sensor needs to spare for
storing secure keys. By showing that the required number of
keys is O(log n) to achieve connectivity at every step of the
deployment, we confirm the scalability of the pairwise scheme
in the context of WSNs.
VII. A PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and γ in the interval (0, 1), and consider
a positive integer K ≥ 2. Throughout the discussion, n is
sufficiently large so that the conditions
2(K + 1) < n, K + 1 ≤ n− ⌊γn⌋ and 2 < γn (15)
are all enforced; these conditions are made in order to avoid
degenerate situations which have no bearing on the final result.
There is no loss of generality in doing so as we eventually let
n go to infinity.
For any non-empty subset R contained in {1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋},
we define the graph Hγ(n;K)(R) (with vertex set R) as the
subgraph of Hγ(n;K) restricted to the nodes in R. We say that
R is isolated in Hγ(n;K) if there are no edges (in Hγ(n;K))
between the nodes in R and the nodes in its complement
Rc|γ := {1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋}−R. This is characterized by the event
Bn,γ(K;R) given by
Bn,γ(K;R) :=
[
i 6∈ Γn,j, j /∈ Γn,i, i ∈ R, j ∈ Rc|γ
]
.
Also, let Cn,γ(K;R) denote the event that the induced sub-
graph Hγ(n;K)(R) is itself connected. Finally, we set
An,γ(K;R) := Cn,γ(K;R) ∩Bn,γ(K;R).
The discussion starts with the following basic observation:
If Hγ(n;K) is not connected, then there must exist a non-
empty subset R of nodes contained in {1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋}, such
that Hγ(n;K)(R) is itself connected while R is isolated in
Hγ(n;K). This is captured by the inclusion
Cn,γ(K)
c ⊆ ∪R∈Nn,γ An,γ(K;R) (16)
with Nn,γ denoting the collection of all non-empty subsets of
{1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋}. This union need only be taken over all non-
empty subsets R of {1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋} with 1 ≤ |R| ≤ ⌊ ⌊γn⌋2 ⌋,
and it is useful to note that ⌊ ⌊γn⌋2 ⌋ = ⌊γn2 ⌋. Then, a standard
union bound argument immediately gives
P [Cn,γ(K)
c] ≤
∑
R∈Nn,γ : 1≤|R|≤⌊
γn
2
⌋
P [An,γ(K;R)]
=
⌊ γn
2
⌋∑
r=1

 ∑
R∈Nn,γ,r
P [An,γ(K;R)]

 (17)
where Nn,γ,r denotes the collection of all subsets of
{1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋} with exactly r elements.
For each r = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋, when R = {1, . . . , r}, we
simplify the notation by writing An,γ,r(K) := An,γ(K;R),
Bn,γ,r(K) := Bn,γ(K;R) and Cn,γ,r(K) := Cn,γ(K;R).
For r = ⌊γn⌋, the notation Cn,γ,⌊γn⌋(K) coincides with
Cn,γ(K) as defined earlier. Under the enforced assumptions,
it is a simple matter to check by exchangeability that
P [An,γ(K;R)] = P [An,γ,r(K)] , R ∈ Nn.γ,r
7and the expression
∑
R∈Nγ,r
P [An,γ(K;R)] =
(⌊γn⌋
r
)
P [An,γ,r(K)]
follows since |Nn,γ,r| =
(
⌊γn⌋
r
)
. Substituting into (17) we
obtain the bounds
P [Cn,γ(K)
c] ≤
⌊ γn
2
⌋∑
r=1
(⌊γn⌋
r
)
P [Bn,γ,r(K)] (18)
as we make use of the obvious inclusion An,γ,r(K) ⊆
Bn,γ,r(K). Under the enforced assumptions, we get
P [Bn,γ,r(K)] (19)
=
((
n−⌊γn⌋+r−1
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)r
·
((
n−r−1
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)⌊γn⌋−r
.
To see why this last relation holds, recall that for the set
{1, . . . , r} to be isolated in Hγ(n;K) we need that (i) each of
the nodes r + 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋ are adjacent only to nodes outside
the set of nodes {1, . . . , r}; and (ii) none of the nodes 1, . . . , r
are adjacent with any of the nodes r+1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋ – This last
requirement does not preclude adjacency with any of the nodes
⌊γn⌋+ 1, . . . , n. Reporting (19) into (18), we conclude that
P [Cn,γ(K)
c] (20)
≤
⌊ γn
2
⌋∑
r=1
(⌊γn⌋
r
)((n−⌊γn⌋+r−1
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)r
·
((
n−r−1
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)⌊γn⌋−r
with conditions (15) ensuring that the binomial coefficients are
well defined.
The remainder of the proof consists in bounding each of
the terms in (20). To do so we make use of several standard
bounds. First we recall the well-known bound(⌊γn⌋
r
)
≤
(⌊γn⌋e
r
)r
, r = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋.
Next, for 0 ≤ K ≤ x ≤ y, we note that(
x
K
)(
y
K
) = K−1∏
ℓ=0
(
x− ℓ
y − ℓ
)
≤
(
x
y
)K
since x−ℓ
y−ℓ decreases as ℓ increases from ℓ = 0 to ℓ = K − 1.
Now pick r = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋. Under (15) we can apply these
bounds to obtain(⌊γn⌋
r
)((n−⌊γn⌋+r−1
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)r
·
((
n−r−1
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)⌊γn⌋−r
≤
(⌊γn⌋e
r
)r
·
(
n− ⌊γn⌋+ r − 1
n− 1
)rK
×
(
n− r − 1
n− 1
)K(⌊γn⌋−r)
≤
(γne
r
)r (
1− ⌊γn⌋ − r
n− 1
)rK (
1− r
n− 1
)K(⌊γn⌋−r)
≤ (γne)r ·
(
1− ⌊γn⌋ − r
n
)rK
·
(
1− r
n
)K(⌊γn⌋−r)
≤ (γne)r · e−( ⌊γn⌋−rn )rK · e−( rn)(⌊γn⌋−r)K .
It is plain that
P [Cn,γ(K)
c] ≤
⌊ γn
2
⌋∑
r=1
(γne)
r · e−2( ⌊γn⌋−rn )rK
≤
⌊ γn
2
⌋∑
r=1
(
γne · e−2
(
⌊γn⌋−⌊
γn
2
⌋
n
)
K
)r
(21)
as we note that
⌊γn⌋ − r
n
≥ ⌊γn⌋ − ⌊
γn
2 ⌋
n
, r = 1, . . . , ⌊γn
2
⌋.
Next, consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 such that (9) holds
for some c > 1, and replace K by Kn in (21) according to
this scaling. Using the form (9) of the scaling we get,
an := γne · e
−2
(
⌊γn⌋−⌊
γn
2
⌋
n
)
Kn
= (γe) · n1−2cn
(
⌊γn⌋−⌊
γn
2
⌋
γn
)
for each n = 1, 2, . . ., with limn→∞ cn = c. It is a simple
matter to check that
lim
n→∞
(
2cn
(⌊γn⌋ − ⌊γn2 ⌋
γn
))
= c,
so that by virtue of the fact that c > 1, we have
lim
n→∞
an = 0. (22)
From (21) we conclude that
P [Cn,γ(Kn)
c] ≤
⌊ γn
2
⌋∑
r=1
(an)
r ≤
∞∑
r=1
(an)
r =
an
1− an
where for n sufficiently large the summability of the
geometric series is guaranteed by (22). The conclusion
limn→∞ P [Cn,γ(K)
c] = 0 is now a straightforward conse-
quence of the last bound, again by virtue of (22).
VIII. A PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider γ in (0, 1) and positive integer
K such that K < n. We write
χn,γ,i(K) := 1 [Node i is isolated in Hγ(n;K)]
for each i = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋. The number of isolated nodes in
Hγ(n;K) is simply given by
In,γ(K) :=
⌊γn⌋∑
i=1
χn,γ,i(K),
whence the random graph Hγ(n;K) has no isolated nodes if
In,γ(K) = 0. The method of first moment [8, Eqn (3.10), p.
55] and second moment [8, Remark 3.1, p. 55] yield the useful
bounds
1−E [In,γ(K)] ≤ P [In,γ(K) = 0] ≤ 1−E [In,γ(K)]
2
E [In,γ(K)2]
. (23)
8The rvs χn,γ,1(K), . . . , χn,γ,⌊γn⌋(K) being exchangeable,
we find
E [In,γ(K)] = ⌊γn⌋E [χn,γ,1(K)] (24)
and
E
[
In,γ(K)
2
]
= ⌊γn⌋E [χn,γ,1(K)] (25)
+ ⌊γn⌋(⌊γn⌋ − 1)E [χn,γ,1(K)χn,γ,2(K)]
by the binary nature of the rvs involved. It then follows in the
usual manner that
E
[
In,γ(K)
2
]
E [In,γ(K)]
2 =
1
⌊γn⌋E [χn,γ,1(K)] (26)
+
⌊γn⌋ − 1
⌊γn⌋
E [χn,γ,1(K)χn,γ,2(K)]
(E [χn,γ,1(K)])
2 .
From (23) and (24) we conclude that the one-law
limn→∞ P [In,γ(Kn) = 0] = 1 holds if we show that
lim
n→∞
⌊γn⌋E [χn,γ,1(Kn)] = 0. (27)
On the other hand, it is plain from (23) and (26) that the
zero-law limn→∞ P [In,γ(Kn) = 0] = 0 will be established if
lim
n→∞
⌊γn⌋E [χn,1(Kn)] =∞ (28)
and
lim sup
n→∞
(
E [χn,γ,1(Kn)χn,γ,2(Kn)]
(E [χn,γ,1(Kn)])
2
)
≤ 1. (29)
The next two technical lemmas establish (27), (28) and (29)
under the appropriate conditions on the scaling K : N0 → N0.
Lemma 8.1: Consider γ in (0, 1) and a scaling K : N0 →
N0 such that (9) holds for some c > 0. We have
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,γ,1(Kn)] =


0 if c > r(γ)
∞ if c < r(γ)
(30)
with r(γ) specified via (11).
Lemma 8.2: Consider γ in (0, 1) and a scaling K : N0 →
N0 such that (9) holds for some c > 0. We have
lim sup
n→∞
(
E [χn,γ,1(Kn)χn,γ,2(Kn)]
(E [χn,γ,1(Kn)])
2
)
≤ 1. (31)
Proofs of Lemma 8.1 and Lemma 8.2 can be found in
Section VIII-A and Section VIII-B, respectively. To complete
the proof of Theorem 4.4, pick a scaling K : N0 → N0
such that (9) holds for some c > 0. Under the condition
c > r(γ) we get (27) from Lemma 8.1 and the one-law
limn→∞ P [In,γ(Kn) = 0] = 1 follows. Next, assume the
condition c < r(γ). We obtain (28) and (29) with the help
of Lemmas 8.1 and 8.2, respectively, and the conclusion
limn→∞ P [In,γ(Kn) = 0] = 0 is now immediate.
A. A proof of Lemma 8.1
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and γ in (0, 1), and consider a positive
integer K such that K < n. Here as well there is no loss of
generality in assuming n− ⌊γn⌋ ≥ K and ⌊γn⌋ > 1. Under
the enforced assumptions, we get
E [χn,γ,1(K)] =
(
n−⌊γn⌋
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
((
n−2
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)⌊γn⌋−1
= a(n;K) ·
(
1− K
n− 1
)⌊γn⌋−1
(32)
with
a(n;K) :=
(n− ⌊γn⌋)!
(n− ⌊γn⌋ −K)! ·
(n− 1−K)!
(n− 1)! .
Now pick a scaling K : N0 → N0 such that (9) holds for
some c > 0 and replace K by Kn in (32) with respect to this
scaling. Applying Stirling’s formula
m! ∼
√
2πm
(m
e
)m
(m→∞)
to the factorials appearing in (32), we readily get
a(n;Kn) ∼
√
(n− ⌊γn⌋)(n− 1−Kn)
(n− ⌊γn⌋ −Kn)(n− 1) · αnβn
∼ αnβn (33)
under the enforced assumptions on the scaling with
αn :=
(n−Kn − 1)n−Kn−1
(n− 1)n−1
=
(
1− Kn
n− 1
)n−1
· (n−Kn − 1)−Kn
and
βn :=
(n− ⌊γn⌋)n−⌊γn⌋
(n− ⌊γn⌋ −Kn)n−⌊γn⌋−Kn
=
(
1− Kn
n− ⌊γn⌋
)−(n−⌊γn⌋)
· (n− ⌊γn⌋ −Kn)Kn .
In obtaining the asymptotic behavior of (33) we rely on the
following technical fact: For any sequence m : N0 → N0 with
mn = O(n), we have(
1− Kn
mn
)mn
∼ e−Kn . (34)
To see why (34) holds, recall the elementary decomposition
log(1− x) = −x−Ψ(x) with Ψ(x) :=
∫ x
0
t
1− t dt
valid for 0 ≤ x < 1. Using this fact, we get(
1− Kn
mn
)mn
= e−Kn · e−mnΨ(Knmn ) (35)
for all n = 1, 2, . . ..
9Under the enforced assumptions we have mn = O(n) and
Kn = O(log n), so that
lim
n→∞
Kn
mn
= 0 and lim
n→∞
mn
(
Kn
mn
)2
= 0.
It is now plain that
lim
n→∞
mnΨ
(
Kn
mn
)
= 0
as we note that limx↓0 Ψ(x)x2 =
1
2 . This establishes (34) via
(35).
Using (34), first with mn = n−1, then with mn = n−⌊γn⌋,
we obtain (
1− Kn
n− 1
)n−1
∼ e−Kn
and (
1− Kn
n− ⌊γn⌋
)−(n−⌊γn⌋)
∼ (e−Kn)−1 = eKn ,
whence
αnβn ∼
(
n− ⌊γn⌋ −Kn
n−Kn − 1
)Kn
. (36)
With the help of (32) and (33) we now conclude that
nE [χn,γ,1(Kn)] (37)
∼ n
(
1− Kn
n− 1
)⌊γn⌋−1
·
(
n− ⌊γn⌋ −Kn
n−Kn − 1
)Kn
.
A final application of (34), this time with mn = n−1, gives
(
1− Kn
n− 1
)⌊γn⌋−1
=
((
1− Kn
n− 1
)n−1) ⌊γn⌋−1n−1
∼ e− ⌊γn⌋−1n−1 Kn (38)
since limn→∞ ⌊γn⌋−1n−1 = γ. Reporting (38) into (37) we obtain
nE [χn,γ,1(Kn)] ∼ eζn (39)
with
ζn := logn−
(⌊γn⌋ − 1
n− 1 + log
(
n− ⌊γn⌋ −Kn
n−Kn − 1
))
Kn
for all n = 1, 2, . . .. Finally, from the condition (9) on the
scaling, we see that
lim
n→∞
ζn
logn
= 1− c+ c log(1 − γ)
γ
= 1− c
r(γ)
.
Thus, limn→∞ ζn = −∞ (resp. ∞) if r(γ) > c (resp. r(γ) <
c) and the desired result follows upon using (39).
B. A proof of Lemma 8.2
Fix positive integers n = 3, 4, . . . and K with K < n. With
γ in (0, 1), we again assume that n−⌊γn⌋ ≥ K and ⌊γn⌋ > 1.
It is a simple matter to check that
E [χn,γ,1(K)χn,γ,2(K)] =
((
n−⌊γn⌋
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)2((n−3
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)⌊γn⌋−2
and invoking (32) we readily conclude that
E [χn,γ,1(K)χn,γ,2(K)]
(E [χn,γ,1(K)])
2
=
((
n−3
K
)
(
n−1
K
)
)⌊γn⌋−2
·
((
n−1
K
)
(
n−2
K
)
)2(⌊γn⌋−1)
=
((
n− 1−K
n− 1
)(
n− 2−K
n− 2
))⌊γn⌋−2
×
(
n− 1
n− 1−K
)2(⌊γn⌋−1)
=
(
n− 2−K
n− 2
)⌊γn⌋−2
·
(
n− 1
n− 1−K
)⌊γn⌋
=
(
1− K
n− 2
)⌊γn⌋−2
·
(
1 +
K
n− 1−K
)⌊γn⌋
≤ e−K·E(n;K) (40)
where we have set
E(n;K) :=
⌊γn⌋ − 2
n− 2 −
⌊γn⌋
n− 1−K .
Elementary calculations show that
−K · E(n;K) = ⌊γn⌋
n− 2 ·
K(K − 1)
n− 1−K +
2K
n− 2 .
Now pick a scaling K : N0 → N0 such that (9) holds for
some c > 0. It is plain that limn→∞KnE(n;Kn) = 0 and
the conclusion (31) follows from (40).
IX. A PROOF OF THEOREM 4.6
Pick 0 < γ1 < γ2 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1 and consider a scaling
K : N0 → N0 such that
Kn ∼ c logn
γ1
for some c > 1. It is plain that (14) will hold provided
lim
n→∞
P [Cn,γk(Kn)] = 1, k = 1, . . . , ℓ. (41)
For each k = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, we note that
c
logn
γ1
= ck
logn
γk
with ck := c
γk
γ1
for all n = 1, 2, . . .. But c > 1 implies ck > 1 since γ1 <
. . . < γℓ. As a result, Hγk(n;Kn) will be a.a.s. connected by
virtue of Theorem 4.3 applied to Hγk(n;K), and (41) indeed
holds.
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X. A PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and positive integer K with K < n. For
each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, node i is assigned a key ring Σn,i whose
size is given by
|Σn,i| = |Γn,i|+
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
1 [i ∈ Γn,j] . (42)
This is a simple consequence of the definition (1). We also
define the maximal key ring size as
Mn := maxi=1,...,n|Σn,i|.
It is easy to see that
|Σn,i| = K +Bn,i (43)
where Bn,i is the rv determined through
Bn,i :=
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
1 [i ∈ Γn,j] .
Under the enforced independence assumptions, the rv Bn,i is
a binomial rv Bin(n− 1, K
n−1 ), with
E [Bn,i] = (n− 1) · K
n− 1 = K
and
Var[Bn,i] = (n− 1) · K
n− 1 ·
n− 1−K
n− 1 .
As a result, E [|Σn,i|] = 2K and
Var[|Σn,i|] = K
(
1− K
n− 1
)
.
It is now plain that
E
[∣∣∣∣ |Σn,i|E [|Σn,i|] − 1
∣∣∣∣
2
]
=
Var[|Σn,i|]
E [|Σn,i|]2
=
1
4
(
1
K
− 1
n− 1
)
(44)
so that
E
[∣∣∣∣ |Σn,i|2K − 1
∣∣∣∣
2
]
=
1
4
(
1
K
− 1
n− 1
)
. (45)
Under the enforced assumptions, we have
lim
n→∞
E
[∣∣∣∣ |Σn,1(Kn)|2Kn − 1
∣∣∣∣
2
]
= 0
by the earlier calculations (45), and the desired result (5)
follows.
XI. A PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
Fix the positive integers n = 2, 3, . . . and K with K < n.
Using (43) we readily get(
max
i=1,...,n
|Σn,i|
)
− 2K = max
i=1,...,n
(Bn,i −K) .
Therefore, with any given t > 0, we find
P
[∣∣∣∣
(
max
i=1,...,n
|Σn,i|
)
− 2K
∣∣∣∣ > t
]
= P
[∣∣∣∣ maxi=1,...,n (Bn,i −K)
∣∣∣∣ > t
]
= P
[
max
i=1,...,n
Bn,i > K + t
]
+ P
[
max
i=1,...,n
Bn,i < K − t
]
. (46)
We take each term in turn. First a simple union argument
shows that
P [maxi=1,...,nBn,i > K + t]
= P [∪ni=1[Bn,i > K + t]]
≤
n∑
i=1
P [Bn,i > K + t]
= nP [Bn,1 > K + t] (47)
since the rvs Bn,1, . . . , Bn,n are identically distributed (but
not independent). Next we note that
P [maxi=1,...,nBn,i < K − t]
= P [Bn,i < K − t, i = 1, . . . n]
≤ mini=1,...,nP [Bn,i < K − t]
= P [Bn,1 < Kn − t] . (48)
To proceed we recall standard bounds for the tails of
binomial rvs [9, lemma 1.1, p. 16]: With
H(t) := 1− t+ t log t,
we have the concentration inequalities
P [Bn.1 > K + t] ≤ e−K·H(K+tK )
and
P [Bn,1 < K − t] ≤ e−K·H(K−tK )
where the additional condition 0 < t < K is required for
the second inequality to hold. Simple calculations on the
appropriate ranges show that
−K ·H
(
K ± t
K
)
= ±t− (K ± t) · log
(
1± t
K
)
.
Thus, by the first concentration inequality, we conclude
from (47) that
P [maxi=1,...,nBn,i > K + t] ≤ eAn(K;t) (49)
with
An(K; t) := logn+ t− (K + t) · log
(
1 +
t
K
)
.
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The second concentration inequality and (48) together yield
P [maxi=1,...,nBn,i < K − t] ≤ eBn(K;t) (50)
with
Bn(K; t) := −t− (K − t) · log
(
1− t
K
)
under the additional constraint 0 < t < K .
Now consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 of the form (6) for
some γ > 0, and select the sequence t : N0 → R+ given by
tn = clogn, n = 1, 2, . . .
with c in the interval (0, γ) (so that 0 < tn < Kn for all n
sufficiently large).
Under appropriate conditions on γ and c, we shall show that
lim
n→∞
An(Kn; tn) = −∞ (51)
and
lim
n→∞
Bn(Kn; tn) = −∞. (52)
The convergence statements
lim
n→∞
P [maxi=1,...,nBn,i(Kn) > Kn + tn] = 0
and
lim
n→∞
P [maxi=1,...,nBn,i(Kn) < Kn − tn] = 0
then follow from (49) and (50), respectively, and the desired
conclusion (7) flows from (46).
With the selections made above, we get An(Kn; tn) ∼
a(γ; c) logn and Bn(Kn; tn) ∼ b(γ; c) logn with coefficients
a(γ; c) and b(γ; c) given by
a(γ; c) := 1 + c− (γ + c) · log
(
1 +
c
γ
)
, c > 0
and
b(γ; c) := −c− (γ − c) · log
(
1− c
γ
)
, 0 < c < γ.
Thus, in order to ensure (51) and (52), we need to find c
in the interval (0, γ) such that a(γ; c) < 0 and b(γ; c) < 0,
respectively. To that end, we first note that
∂a
∂c
(γ; c) = − log
(
1 +
c
γ
)
< 0, c > 0
and
∂b
∂c
(γ; c) = log
(
1− c
γ
)
< 0, 0 < c < γ.
Therefore, both mappings c → a(γ; c) and c → b(γ; c) are
strictly decreasing on the intervals (0,∞) and (0, γ), respec-
tively. Since limc↓0 b(γ; c) = 0, it is plain that b(γ; c) < 0 on
the entire interval (0, γ). On the other hand, it is easy to check
that limc↓0 a(γ; c) = 1 and
lim
c↑γ
a(γ; c) = 1− γ (2 log 2− 1) = 1− γ
γ⋆
.
Hence, if we select γ > γ⋆, then a(γ; c) < 0 for all c > c(γ)
where c(γ) is the unique solution to the equation
a(γ; c) = 0, c > 0. (53)
Uniqueness is a consequence of the strict monotonicity men-
tioned earlier.
The proof will be completed by showing that the constraint
c(γ) < γ, γ > γ⋆ (54)
indeed holds. For each γ > 0, define the quantity x(γ) := c(γ)
γ
.
In view of (53) it is the unique solution to the equation
1
γ
+ x− (1 + x) log (1 + x) = 0, x > 0. (55)
This equation is equivalent to
1
γ
= ϕ(x), x > 0 (56)
where the mapping ϕ : R+ → R+ is given by
ϕ(x) = (1 + x) log (1 + x)− x, x ≥ 0.
This mapping ϕ : R+ → R+ is strictly monotone increasing
with limx↓0 ϕ(x) = 0 and limx↑∞ ϕ(x) = ∞, so that ϕ is
a bijection from R+ onto itself. It then follows from (56)
that x(γ) is strictly decreasing as γ increases. Since ϕ(1) =
(γ⋆)
−1
, we get x(γ⋆) = 1 by uniqueness, whence x(γ) <
x(γ⋆) = 1 for γ > γ⋆, a statement equivalent to (54).
Careful inspection of the proof shows that (8) holds with
h(γ; c) := −max (a(γ; c), b(γ; c)) (57)
on the range c(γ) < c < γ, and it is clear from the discussion
above that h(γ; c) > 0 when γ > γ⋆.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by NSF Grant CCF-07290.
REFERENCES
[1] S.R. Blackburn and S. Gerke, “Connectivity of the uniform random
intersection graph,” Discrete Mathematics 309 (2009), pp. 5130-5140.
[2] B. Bolloba´s, Random Graphs, Second Edition, Cambridge Studies in
Advanced Mathematics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK),
2001.
[3] H. Chan, A. Perrig and D. Song, “Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the SP 2003, Oakland (CA),
May 2003, pp. 197-213.
[4] R. Di Pietro, L.V. Mancini, A. Mei, A. Panconesi and J. Radhakrish-
nan, “Redoubtable sensor networks,” ACM Transactions on Information
Systems Security TISSEC 11 (2008), pp. 1-22.
[5] W. Du, J. Deng, Y.S. Han and P.K. Varshney, “A pairwise key pre-
distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the
CCS 2003, Washington (DC), October 2004.
[6] L. Eschenauer and V.D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme for dis-
tributed sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the CSS 2002, Washington
(DC), November 2002, pp. 41-47.
[7] J. Hwang and Y. Kim, “Revisiting random key pre-distribution schemes
for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the SASN 2004,
Washington (DC), October 2004.
[8] S. Janson, T. Łuczak and A. Rucin´ski, Random Graphs, Wiley-
Interscience Series in Discrete Mathematics and Optimization, John
Wiley & Sons, 2000.
12
[9] M.D. Penrose, Random Geometric Graphs, Oxford Studies in Probability
5, Oxford University Press, New York (NY), 2003.
[10] A. Perrig, J. Stankovic and D. Wagner, “Security in wireless sensor
networks,” Communications of the ACM 47 (2004), pp. 53–57.
[11] K. Rybarczyk “Diameter, connectivity and phase transition of the
uniform random intersection graph,” Submitted to Discrete Mathematics,
July 2009.
[12] D.-M. Sun and B. He, “Review of key management mechanisms in
wireless sensor networks,” Acta Automatica Sinica 12 (2006), pp. 900-
906.
[13] O. Yag˘an and A.M. Makowski, “On the random graph induced by a
random key predistribution scheme under full visibility,” in Proceedings
of the ISIT 2008, Toronto (ON), June 2008.
[14] O. Yag˘an and A. M. Makowski, “Connectivity results for random key
graphs,” in Proceedings of the ISIT 2009, Seoul (Korea), June 2009.
[15] O. Yag˘an and A.M. Makowski, “Zero-one laws for connectivity in
random key graphs,” Available online at arXiv:0908.3644v1 [math.CO],
August 2009.
[16] O. Yag˘an and A. M. Makowski, “On random pairwise graphs,”
to be submitted to Discrete Mathematics. Available online at
http://www.ece.umd.edu/∼oyagan/Journals/Pairwise-DM.pdf
